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The Fed has 
taken a series of 
actions—many 
unprecedented—that 
may have finally 
positioned the 
economy for growth.
Fed Policy in the Financial Crisis: 
Arresting the Adverse Feedback Loop
by Danielle DiMartino Booth and Jessica J. Renier
an adverse feedback loop takes hold when a weakening financial sys-
tem and a slowing economy feed off each other. a crisis or shock curtails lending, 
hobbling the real economy; the more production and employment falter, the 
more lending contracts, causing further harm to the economy. the result is a 
downward spiral of business and financial activity. 
the Federal open market Committee (FomC) warned of the danger 
in late January 2008, when few analysts recognized that a recession had begun 
the previous month. It noted “the especially worrisome possibility of an adverse 
feedback loop; that is, a situation in which a tightening of credit conditions 
could depress investment and consumer spending, which, in turn, could feed 
back to a further tightening of credit conditions.”1  EconomicLetter  Federal reserve Bank oF dallas 2   Federal reserve Bank oF dallas  EconomicLetter
The financial crisis validated the 
FOMC’s concern, igniting what has 
become the worst post-World War 
II economic downturn in terms of 
length and, by some measures, depth 
and breadth. Housing market troubles 
began in 2006 and deepened well 
into 2009. As the economy sank into 
recession, an October 2008 Fed survey 
found that two-thirds of banks had 
tightened standards for the highest-
quality residential mortgages and over 
three-quarters had reined in business 
lending. The credit contraction sent 
spending down and unemployment 
up, exacerbating threats to the finan-
cial sector and dimming prospects for 
stability in housing.
Arresting the adverse feedback 
loop could prove to be the seminal 
challenge of early 21st century mon-
etary policymaking. Since sounding the 
alarm in January 2008, the Fed has tak-
en a series of actions—many unprece-
dented—to prevent additional damage 
to financial markets and restore lend-
ing activity. These policies have had 
some success in loosening the grip of 
the adverse feedback loop and may 
have finally positioned the economy 
for growth. Still, doubts linger. The risk 
remains that the actions may prove 
insufficient to put the economy on a 
clear path to rising employment and 
stable prices. 
 
Knocked for a Loop
An adverse feedback loop’s seeds 
are often planted in good times. As 
the U.S. economy emerged from the 
2000–01 recession, lax lending stan-
dards and excessive borrowing led to 
an unprecedented housing boom. Easy 
credit prompted many Americans to 
become first-time homeowners, putting 
upward pressure on housing prices 
and emboldening builders to borrow 
to meet the leverage-fueled demand. 
The surge in risky lending couldn’t 
have occurred without the pooling of 
loans for sale to investors as securities. 
Feeding these securitization markets 
was the rapidly growing, $11 trillion 
shadow banking system, a catchall term 
for nonbank financial institutions such 
as investment banks and hedge funds.
By late 2008, mortgages and home 
equity loans accounted for 109 per-
cent of disposable personal income, 
up from 65 percent in 1995. In the 
fourth quarter of 2005, real estate 
investment in new homes hit a 54-year 
high of 6.3 percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP), well above the 5.7 
percent average of the six housing 
construction-cycle peaks since 1955. 
Homeownership rates crested at 69.2 
percent in late 2004, nearly 5 percent-
age points above the long-term aver-
age of 64.3 percent (Chart 1). 
The housing boom ended abrupt-
ly in late 2005, sending homeowner-
ship rates back down. Several factors 
were at work. First, a choking off of 
lending exiled the marginal buyers 
who had fueled the market. Second, 
delinquencies rose sharply as adjust-
able-rate loans reset to higher interest 
rates, sending shock waves through 
credit markets. Third, supply began 
to overwhelm demand, putting down-
ward pressure on housing prices.
Key housing indicators went into 
full-fledged retreat. As lenders grew 
wary of risk and securitization markets 
turned balky, mortgage credit evapo-
rated, particularly for the riskier seg-
ments that had been driving housing 
demand. Subprime mortgages fell from 
a peak of nearly $1 trillion in May 
2007—a 10th of the U.S. mortgage 
market—to $560 billion in August 
2009 (Chart 2A). The Alt-A market, 
which surpassed the subprime market 
in May 2007, dwindled from its peak 
of $1 trillion in August 2007 to $740 
billion in August 2009.2 
The quarterly rate of new foreclo-
sures first broke prior cycles’ records 
in the last three months of 2006 
(Chart 2B). A forecast by the hous-
ing research firm Zelman & Associates 
calls for 3.51 million U.S. households 
to receive foreclosure notices in 2009 
and for about 2.25 million of those to 
result in lost homes. In the four years 
through 2012, the forecast is for 10.7 
million households to default and 6.5 
million to lose their homes. 
Problems have been acute for 
adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), 
which surpassed fixed-rate loans as a 
share of new issues near the housing 
boom’s height in March 2005. Even 
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so, ARMs made up only 6.8 percent 
of total U.S. mortgages in the third 
quarter of 2007, but their rapid dete-
rioration had a large impact. Some 43 
percent of foreclosures started during 
the quarter were attached to subprime 
ARMs.3
Waning enthusiasm for high-risk 
mortgages curtailed housing demand. 
Meanwhile, rising foreclosures added 
to supply at a time when home build-
ers hadn’t yet heeded signals to cut 
new construction.
Vacant homes for sale, a measure 
that excludes occupied houses that 
could be pulled from the market, helps 
gauge overbuilding. After running at 
1.4 percent for 50 years, the vacancy 
rate began to rise in late 2005, hitting a 
peak of 2.9 percent at the end of 2008 
(Chart 2C). The rate has since declined 
Chart 2
Tracking the Housing Market Collapse
A. Subprime, Alt-A Mortgages Fall from Peaks B. Foreclosures Rise Sharply at End of 2006
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Declining home 
prices remains the 
biggest challenge to 
arresting the adverse 
feedback loop.
to 2.5 percent, but the overhang still 
means supply exceeds demand by 
more than 830,000 homes. 
When the housing troubles began, 
home prices hadn’t fallen nationally 
since the Great Depression. So the 
confluence of tighter mortgage credit, 
rising delinquencies and excess sup-
ply produced a result that could only 
be regarded as extraordinary. The 
greatest home price appreciation in 
U.S. history—an 85 percent run-up in 
six years—gave way to a 35 percent 
plunge from the peak in 2006 (Chart 
2D). Declining home prices remains 
the biggest challenge to arresting the 
adverse feedback loop. 
 
The Pain Spreads
As housing prices started to tum-
ble in early 2007, debate centered on 
whether the damage would be limited 
to the housing sector or spread to the 
wider economy. By the end of 2008, 
the housing bust began to affect con-
sumer spending, employment and bor-
rowing. It was clear the adverse feed-
back loop the Fed feared had arrived.
A key factor was debt, which had 
piled up during the housing boom as 
rapidly rising home prices embold-
ened consumers to spend beyond their 
means. In the seven years leading up 
to 2008, U.S. households accumulated 
the same amount of debt as they did 
in the previous 26 years (Chart 3). 
Throughout the 2000–01 reces-
sion, Americans continued to increase 
spending. This time around, a tight-
ening vise of debt and credit forced 
households to pull back, leading to the 
nation’s first consumption decline since 
the fourth quarter of 1991. Wary con-
sumers cut into companies’ sales and 
profits, adding troubled businesses to 
the economy’s downward spiral. 
Businesses faced another obsta-
cle—tightening credit markets. Even 
the largest corporations with the stron-
gest credit standings had to pay higher 
interest rates to access working capital. 
Small businesses, which often rely on 
credit cards to pay operating expenses, 
faced even more severe restrictions. 
By the second half of 2008, a National 
Small Business Association survey 
found that 69 percent of companies 
were battling tighter terms on their 
credit cards.4 
Falling revenues and constrained 
credit proved a toxic combination 
for many employers. Nearly 7 mil-
lion American workers lost their 
jobs between the recession’s start in 
December 2007 and August 2009— 
the biggest percentage drop in 
employment in any economic slump 
since 1949. By the conventional 
barometer, unemployment rose to 9.7 
percent. A broader measure shows 
even greater pain. Effective unemploy-
ment, which includes those working 
part time for economic reasons and 
those who’ve given up looking for 
jobs, rose to 16.8 percent in August—
its highest mark since the series began 
in 1994.5 
Mortgage delinquencies initially 
gained momentum without a rise in 
the jobless rate, a phenomenon not 
seen in previous housing downturns. 
After the recession began, higher 
unemployment led to a feedback loop, 
providing a secondary spur to push 
Chart 3
Household Debt Burden Rises Sharply
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The unrelenting cycle 
of contracting credit 
bleeding into the 
real economy has 
severely hampered 
the housing market’s 
ability to recover. 
delinquencies higher and extending 
troubles to even the most creditworthy 
homeowners. 
In the 12 months ending June 
2009, prime borrowers’ share of fixed-
rate conventional loans in arrears or 
foreclosure grew faster than any other 
mortgage market segment, doubling 
to 6.6 percent. Making matters worse 
was the increased number of ARMs 
that reset to higher interest rates. The 
adjustment is far from over. About $1.1 
trillion in mortgages will reset over the 
next three years, including many of the 
more exotic Alt-A, jumbo, option-ARM 
and interest-only mortgages underwrit-
ten during the boom years.6 
The feedback loop spiraled further 
down as untenable mortgage payments 
made it harder for households to meet 
other obligations. Credit card and 
auto loan charge-offs then climbed to 
record levels. So did delinquencies on 
home-equity loans. 
For many, the debt burdens 
became too heavy. Personal bankrupt-
cy filings per day have soared 136 per-
cent since 2006, approaching levels last 
seen in 2005, before a new law made 
filing more arduous.7 Business bank-
ruptcy filings have risen at an even 
faster pace recently, a further indica-
tion of constrained credit’s adverse 
feedback into the real economy.
Borrowers’ mounting troubles 
led banks to tighten lending poli-
cies beyond the mortgage market. 
For example, lenders began reducing 
credit card lines for households and 
small businesses. Issuers cut $500 bil-
lion of credit card lines in the last 
three months of 2008, with predictions 
for an additional $2.7 trillion by the 
end of 2010.8 
Borrowers were pulling back at 
the same time, further evidence of 
a growing reluctance to spend. By 
February 2009, American consumers 
had done something unprecedented. 
They reduced their credit card use and 
pushed balances below year-earlier 
levels—the first interruption of rising 
U.S. indebtedness on record (Chart 
4). Automobile loans have also been 
declining, but at a slower rate. Overall, 
consumer credit outstanding has fallen 
$110 billion from its July 2008 peak— 
a 4.2 percent annualized rate.
The unrelenting cycle of con-
tracting credit bleeding into the real 
economy has severely hampered the 
housing market’s ability to recover. In 
some cases, lenders appear to be hold-
ing foreclosed homes off the market, 
hoping for a rebound that would save 
them from posting losses. A four-state 
analysis by consultant RealtyTrac, 
made public in January, found that real 
estate listings included only a third of 
the foreclosures it had in its database.9 
The other two-thirds—the shadow 
inventory of homes—helps explain 
why foreclosure filings flowing into 
the pipeline haven’t caused even larger 
price declines.
Over the past two years, the ini-
tial troubles in housing have spilled 
over to the broader economy, caus-
ing a downward cycle of distress in 
consumer spending, employment and 
credit markets and creating greater 
risks for the housing sector. Fears that 
continued deterioration in housing 
would lead to further losses led to Fed 
Chart 4
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actions aimed at arresting the adverse 
feedback loop. 
 
The Fed Takes Action
Early on, the Fed saw the possibil-
ity of an adverse feedback loop, and it 
has marshaled a combination of con-
ventional and unconventional policies 
in an attempt to avert and then break 
the downward spiral. As the financial 
crisis sapped lending in 2008, the cen-
tral bank acted to increase credit avail-
ability, or at least to reduce its cost, by 
aggressively cutting the federal funds 
rate, its primary policy tool for influ-
encing borrowing costs. By December 
2008, rates were close to zero, their 
lower limit. 
While it was cutting rates, the 
Fed introduced programs to auc-
tion collateralized long-term loans 
to banks, extend discount window 
operations to primary dealers and cre-
ate a lending facility to allow money 
market funds direct access to collater-
alized loans.
Financial market troubles deep-
ened in the fall of 2008, prompting the 
Fed to take its response to another lev-
el with initiatives that might be charac-
terized as credit easing for the broad 
economy. Some initiatives sought to 
mitigate collateral damage to the real 
economy stemming from the credit cri-
sis. Others targeted falling home prices 
by addressing obstacles to residential 
mortgage lending. 
Many business operations were 
hampered by the squeeze on short-
term financing, a key source of work-
ing capital needed to prevent deeper 
reductions in inventories, jobs and 
wages. To this end, the Fed funded 
purchases of top-rated commercial 
paper through the commercial paper 
funding facility, announced in October 
2008. Since then, commercial paper 
markets have seen wider issuance and 
narrower spreads—both signs of a 
return to normalcy.10
Unfreezing consumer lending 
beyond mortgages came into play 
with the term asset-backed securi-
ties loan facility, or TALF, announced 
in November 2008.11 The TALF’s first 
phase injected liquidity into the secu-
ritization markets for credit card, auto-
mobile and small business lending. Its 
second phase provided financing to 
the commercial real estate market, a 
sector that has increasingly threatened 
to destabilize banks’ capital positions 
through a fresh wave of write-downs 
and losses. 
In November 2008, the Fed made 
a direct assault on troubled housing 
markets through the purchase of resi-
dential mortgage-backed securities, 
a program expanded in March 2009. 
Since the program began, mortgage 
interest rates have generally declined, 
encouraging homebuying and refinanc-
ing (Chart 5). Refinancing activity has 
doubled since last year, saving many 
homeowners from foreclosure and 
preventing further additions to the 
shadow inventory of homes for sale. 
In some parts of the country, low-
er home prices are bringing demand 
and supply into sync. In California, 
distressed sales have helped pull prices 
down to much more affordable levels 
in a relatively short time. After surging 
to nearly $600,000 during the boom, 
Chart 5
Fed Actions Help Reduce Mortgage Interest Rates 
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California’s median home price fell 
below $250,000 in early 2009 (Chart 
6). It then rose for five consecutive 
months through July 2009, a sign that 
the market has pulled out of its tail-
spin. Renewed demand at a lower 
price point pushed inventories to a 
3.9-month supply, the lowest in three 
and a half years.
In 2009, the Fed has continued 
to pursue policies aimed at breaking 
the adverse feedback loop. With the 
federal funds rate near zero, the Fed 
still tried to inject added buying power 
into the economy through quantitative 
easing, a seldom-used policy tool that 
seeks to spur bank lending by increas-
ing the money supply through direct 
purchases of securities. On March 18, 
the Fed said it would buy $300 bil-
lion in Treasury securities to push 
their interest yields down, hoping to 
encourage banks to lend more freely.12 
 
Dangers Still Loom
The Fed attacked the adverse 
feedback loop aggressively, using a 
broad range of innovative policies to 
break the downward momentum at 
several points. Toward the end of sum-
mer 2009, the pace of the economy’s 
decline had slowed and positive signs 
were showing up in financial markets, 
housing and manufacturing.
These bits of good news are 
heartening, but dangers still lurk. The 
global financial system has taken an 
estimated $1.6 trillion in losses since 
the crisis erupted. Even so, a lot more 
bad debt remains on balance sheets, 
hindering ability and willingness to 
lend. Institutions have yet to absorb 
the traditional losses that flow from 
recession.
A majority of U.S. consumers 
responding to University of Michigan 
surveys have said they expect high 
unemployment to persist over the next 
several years, a mindset that could 
pose challenges for policymakers. The 
worries will continue to put downward 
pressure on consumer spending and 
company revenues. Struggling employ-
ers will be reluctant to add jobs and 
could even impose further cuts, which 
would continue to feed delinquencies 
and pressure home prices, making 
it more difficult to arrest the adverse 
feedback loop. 
Housing’s road to recovery may 
contain potholes. For example, loan 
modifications may simply forestall 
eventual foreclosures. Recent Boston 
Fed research found that nearly half of 
renegotiated mortgages fall delinquent 
again within six months.13 No doubt, 
more foreclosures will increase the 
downward pressure on prices and add 
to the excess supply of homes on the 
market.
The unsold homes that clog bank 
balance sheets will hit the market at 
some point. Including the shadow 
inventory increases the supply of exist-
ing homes for sale from 9.4 months to 
12 months as of July.14
High foreclosure rates perpetuate 
the adverse feedback loop, but they 
may be a necessary price to pay to 
unravel the housing market’s excesses. 
By forcing home prices to more sus-
tainable levels, foreclosures play an 
important role in clearing markets. 
Affordability is critical to a lasting 
Chart 6
California Housing Market Moves Toward Clearing Level 
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recovery in the housing market and, 
by extension, the broader economy. 
The strategy for arresting the 
adverse feedback loop is to interrupt 
the downward spiral at several points, 
not just in the housing and financial 
markets that started it all. The econ-
omy’s recent trends are encouraging, 
but the potential dangers suggest it’s 
too soon to conclude that the adverse 
feedback loop has been broken.
DiMartino Booth is a financial analyst and Renier 
is a research analyst in the Research Department 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
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